

## Percepción de la corrupción, el narcotráfico y la esfera política en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca, Hidalgo

*Perception of corruption, drug trafficking and the political sphere in the  
metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca, Hidalgo*

*Percepção de corrupção, tráfico de drogas e esfera política na região  
metropolitana da cidade de Pachuca, Hidalgo*

**Asael Ortiz Lazcano**

Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Hidalgo, México

[lazcano@uaeh.edu.mx](mailto:lazcano@uaeh.edu.mx)

### Resumen

Esta investigación muestra cómo la participación política de los ciudadanos en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca está alejada no solo de las urnas sino también de la propia esfera política; en este sentido, hay una despolitización; no hay un interés por parte de los residentes de la zona geográfica, en participar en procesos políticos ni en votar; así, solo un grupo de habitantes vota asiduamente. Sin duda esta ausencia de las urnas se debe a distintas causas, sin embargo a partir de una encuesta, se demuestra que existe una relación estrecha entre no votar y la percepción de la corrupción en los diferentes niveles de gobierno.

El comportamiento es acorde a lo descrito por Edgardo Buscaglia, quién afirma que en México no puede surgir ningún tipo de sistema democrático electoral dado que la corrupción y la delincuencia organizada nacen de la corrupción político-electoral; lo anterior impacta en ese desencanto de la ciudadanía hacia la política y, en consecuencia, su participación (Buscaglia, 2015). El objetivo de esta investigación es conocer y reflexionar sobre la participación política electoral de los residentes de la ciudad de Pachuca, a partir de cómo entienden el actuar de los políticos, así como la percepción de la corrupción y el vínculo con el narcotráfico. La materia prima de este trabajo es una encuesta cuantitativa que calcule los comportamientos universales;

para ello se llevó a cabo a nivel intermunicipal a inicios del 2015 y tiene una confianza del 95%, un error estándar del 5%, una no respuesta del 20%; se levantaron en total 1 920 cuestionarios en hogares.

**Palabras clave:** ciudadanía, Pachuca, corrupción, participación, encuesta.

### **Abstract**

This research shows how the political participation in the metropolitan area of Pachuca is far removed not only from the polls but also from the political sphere itself; so, there is a depoliticization; There is no interest of the residents of this geographical area, in participating in the political processes or voting; Thus, only a group of citizens vote regularly. No doubt this absence of the polls is due to different causes, however from a survey, it is shown that there is a close relationship between not voting and the perception of corruption at different levels of government.

The behavior is in accordance with what Edgardo Buscaglia described, which states that in Mexico no type of electoral democratic system can arise since corruption and organized crime are born of political-electoral corruption; the foregoing impacts on this disenchantment of citizenship towards politics and, consequently, their participation (Buscaglia, 2015). The objective of this research is to know and reflect on the electoral political participation of the residents of Pachuca city, based on how they understand the behavior of politicians, as well as the perception of corruption and the link with drug trafficking. The raw material of this work is a quantitative survey that calculates the universal behaviors; it was carried out at the intermunicipal level at the beginning of 2015 and has a confidence of 95%, a standard error of 5%, a non-response of 20%. A total of 1 920 questionnaires were collected in households

**Key words:** Citizens, Pachuca, Corruption, Participation, Survey.

## Resumo

Esta pesquisa mostra como a participação política dos cidadãos na área metropolitana da cidade de Pachuca está muito longe, não só das pesquisas, mas também da própria esfera política; nesse sentido, há uma despolitização; não há interesse por parte dos moradores da área geográfica, participação em processos políticos ou votação; Assim, apenas um grupo de habitantes vota assiduamente. Sem dúvida, essa ausência das pesquisas se deve a causas diferentes, no entanto, a partir de uma pesquisa, mostra-se que existe uma estreita relação entre não votar e a percepção de corrupção em diferentes níveis de governo.

O comportamento está de acordo com o que Edgardo Buscaglia descreveu, o que afirma que no México não pode surgir nenhum tipo de sistema eleitoral democrático, uma vez que a corrupção e o crime organizado nascem da corrupção político-eleitoral; Os impactos anteriores sobre esse desencanto da cidadania em relação à política e, conseqüentemente, sua participação (Buscaglia, 2015). O objetivo desta pesquisa é conhecer e refletir sobre a participação política eleitoral dos moradores da cidade de Pachuca, com base em como eles entendem o comportamento dos políticos, bem como a percepção de corrupção e o vínculo com o narcotráfico. A matéria-prima deste trabalho é uma pesquisa quantitativa que calcula os comportamentos universais; para isso foi realizado no nível intermunicipal no início de 2015 e tem uma confiança de 95%, um erro padrão de 5%, uma não resposta de 20%; um total de 1 920 questionários foram coletados em domicílios.

**Palavras-chave:** cidadania, Pachuca, corrupção, participação, pesquisa.

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## 1. Introduction

This paper is based on the hypothesis that the residents of the city of Pachuca, Hidalgo, are moving away from the political sphere due to their appreciation of corruption and the presence of drug trafficking in the spheres of power. This hypothesis is supported by Edgardo Buscaglia, who, based on liberal theory, refers that when a country tries to move to democracy, most of the political transitions generate gaps in institutional power of the state, which occupy non-state actors, such as oligopolistic broadcasters, transnational criminal enterprises, criminal groups that are beginning to become de facto authorities, all of which replace the state itself (Buscaglia, 2013).

This transformation of de facto powers generates political connotations and power, and even manages markets for both legal and illegal goods and services; their profits are extensive and generate ambition among all who can enter that business. The key of entry certainly is the political space, although it does not always ensure a place in that market (Buscaglia, 2013).

Crime for Buscaglia is a worldwide phenomenon: mafia companies are set up as international companies; for this reason the State must make a fight of efficient crime if it wants to obtain good results. Buscaglia, for example, argues that the increase in crime in Mexico may be due to countries such as Colombia that have effectively attacked drug traffickers, forcing Mexicans to reoccupy their country (Buscaglia, 2013).

When oligopolies and monopolies exist, they block the basic services for human development. For Buscaglia, this is an ideal space for corruption, where there is no rule of law. On the other hand, it lacks the minimum controls to deal with those entities that try to seize state power gaps (Buscaglia, 2015 ). This thesis is an interesting variant with respect to Foucault, who affirms that the subject of power can not be centralized in an institution or in the State; power is not considered as an object that the individual gives to the sovereign, but is a relationship of forces, a strategic situation within a society at a given time. Therefore, power is everywhere. The subject that is crossed by relations of power, can not be considered independently of them. Power, for Foucault, not only represses but also produces and generates effects of truth, produces knowledge in the sense of knowledge, but also produces markets, whether lawful or illicit (Foucault, 1979).

These ideas are collected by Buscaglia, who concludes that power without good surveillance in developing countries, generates great difficulties, as they grow but without order; in this sense, structures are reproduced (eg employment, prostitution, housing, services, whether lawful or illicit, alcohol consumption, drugs, illicit sale of cigarettes, etc.). Therefore, a state must be strong, orderly, governed by a rigid rule of law, which allows to control these power gaps and prevent entities outside the business to do business at the expense of the population, which in the long run would crumble that power biopolitical

Underpinning this idea of the relations between corruption and power, other ideas are noticed, for example the one to emphasize that for some the abstentionists do not constitute a homogeneous block. For Muxel there are two types of abstentionism: the sociological type and the political type (Muxel, 2006). The first type of abstentionism refers to voters who are little interested in politics and who, therefore, maintain a sense of estrangement. The other type of political abstentionism encompasses all those citizens who are interested in politics and who at the same time feel part of some political organization but do not go to the polls to cast their votes.

However, although there is such group membership and this interest in the political sphere, abstentionism expresses above all a protest against the political class or a sanction directed at the government administration and try to influence the proposals, whether of the rulers or the candidates; in short, is a claim (Muxel, 2006). That is the final position that I consider to be noticed in this work, the abstentionism to a greater extent is a silent protest before a state that punishes, violates and violates the rights.

In a study carried out by the National Electoral Institute, six factors that reflect electoral abstention in Mexico are outlined: 1) the high cost of elections; 2) the lack of meaning and effectiveness of the political class; 3) the insurmountable distance between the campaign proposals and the demands of the citizens; 4) poor identification of citizens with political parties; 5) the type of authority that is chosen; and 6) the proliferation of campaigns focused on disqualifications (INE, 2010). For the case in question, it seems that the distance between campaign proposals and citizens' demands, as well as the scarce identification of citizens with political parties, play an important role in such a move away.

We must also return to what was raised by Ana Fernández Poncela, who points out that a good number of voters refrain from voting motivated by political reasons, rather than by political disinterest in general; in this sense, the author argues that disinterest does not indicate apathy, and should be interpreted as a derivation of generalized overeating towards the actions of politicians in our society (Fernández Poncela, 2009).

Finally, it is not possible to ignore what Schmidt mentions, when he states that the depoliticization of Mexican society has also caused a lack of a national agenda because politicians lack the factual possibility of action. as of future thinking. History shows us that political parties despise society through the power struggle, without taking the trouble to present country models or at least, ideas of the course to follow; In the face of this panorama, the great national problems are ignored and a surprising lag is generated (Schmidt, 2016).

Schmidt talks about Mexico as a vanquished state; their relationship with organized crime is transformed into an authorized crime. It is based on the premise that Mexico is the most unequal country in Latin America and that the gap between social classes has widened. On the other hand, the economic importance of Mexico in the world has dropped substantially, passing from 9 to 14 worldwide in just 11 years (Schmidt, 2016). Schmidt shows us in his text the relationship between drug trafficking, power, politics, abuses, judges, magistrates, among other political and social actors; Mexico has examples of corruption, abuse of power, ranging from the imperceptible to the grotesque and burlesque. On the other hand, structural violence must combat criminal violence, which includes state violence, ie authorized crimes. The above causes that criminal groups control the production, charge right of floor or the protection. The state is diminished in its power and reach before these delinquent groups. Criminals have set behavior patterns in the production chain and have taken steps to launder their money. They establish themselves as legitimate businessmen, respectable personalities and community leaders, build infrastructure, churches, create jobs, and donate money for political campaigns. In this regard, there is evidence of organized crime intervention in elections, which includes the possibility of winning deputies, senadurías, mayors, regidurías, etc., which creates a legislative fraction supported by criminals. All these examples are observed by the citizenry, which seems to opt for abstentionism, as a decent but insufficient exit.

## 1.1 Defining corruption

In the social sciences, Joseph S. Nye defines corruption as the behavior of a public official who deviates from the formal duties of his office due to a private gain that may be related to an improvement in status, with pecuniary or personal property; or that violates rules that outlaw the exercise of certain types of private influences (Nye, 1989). This definition includes behaviors such as bribery, nepotism, fraudulent appropriation of public resources, among other factors. For Nathaniel Leff, corruption is an extra legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of bureaucrats. As such, the existence of corruption by itself indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process in a more extensive way than they would in other circumstances (Leff, 2002). For his part, Friedrich refers to corruption as long as someone who holds a power and is responsible for doing certain things, acts for himself or others, that is, an official with responsibility or power decides to take action in favor of anyone who offers you money or other illegal recognition and therefore, deteriorates the public interest by putting a personal interest (Friedrich, 2002).

## 1.2 Types of Corruption

For experts in the field, different types of corruption should be differentiated. Some refer that corruption can be normal, widespread, and systemic; for others there is a transitional corruption, differentiated from ordinary corruption. However, there are a large number of types of corruption as existing spaces in a State; as an example, administrative corruption is very broad, ranging from avoiding some minimal administrative penalty or fine, to accepting donations or bribes to obtain contracts or tenders.

There are other classifications of corruption. For example, in relation to the area in which decisions are circumscribed, corruption may be public or private. In this sense, political, administrative and judicial corruption can be mentioned in the public sphere, while in the private sphere one can observe economic, religious, sports corruption, among others.

Regarding the people involved in acts of corruption, at first it requires the presence of two actors, the corruptor and the corrupt. However, this is not entirely true; corrupt plots can take a variety of

ways, for example, corrupt ones can act alone, as in the case of embezzlement of public funds or in the convenience of others. They can also act directly or through intermediaries or by forming triangular frames characterized by being developed by fictitious companies, which facilitate the transfer of profits obtained.

On the other hand, structures of corruption can be organic, that is, when it comes to permanent organizations, or inorganic when it comes to structures created ad hoc; in each case of corruption, a different structure can be adopted, since there are no defined rules within this phenomenon.

Taking as reference the public opinion and the social practices from which the fact is judged, the majority of theorists distinguish three forms of corruption. First, black corruption includes those acts that society does not hesitate to describe as corrupt. A second term of corruption is the so-called white, consisting of acts so common to society that although they are known to be corrupt, are considered allowed and even come to be valued as non-corrupt. A third term of corruption is the so-called gray, which Lamo de Espinoza refers to as a "penumbra zone" and includes the actions that circumscribe it, it is usually not clear whether or not they can be classified as corrupt, as they ultimately depend on how they perceive themselves socially and how they change time and space (Lamo de Espinoza, 2009). It is important to emphasize what Nye explained, in the sense of leaving a wide margin of action before this type of acts, guided by subjective criteria, tending to act by private interests rather than by the general ones.

### **1.3 Corruption in the world and the case of Mexico**

Within the present work and supported by the different corruption indices carried out by non-governmental organizations in the national and international context, it can be concluded that corruption is a serious problem within Mexico. In 2007, according to the Transparency International report, the country ranked 57 out of 102 countries that were measured around corruption; however Mexico has been rising in the level of corruption. The lowest corruption was observed in countries like Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Iceland, Sweden and Canada. The countries with the highest corruption were Kenya, Angola, Madagascar, Paraguay, Nigeria and Bangladesh.



Eliminating corruption is no easy task; several scholars in the national and international context consider that criminal organizations, specifically those led by drug trafficking, have established strong roots within national governmental structures, administration of justice, and even within the bureaucratic system, which has created the scenarios corrupt politicians who have even financed political campaigns. For this reason, money laundering, criminal financing and the State structure have learned to work together. However, aside from academic discussions and the visibility of such behaviors, the ordinary citizen perceives these relationships as collusion (Buscaglia 2013, 2015).

Corruption in the global context has become a subject of great importance in the last fifteen years and has been recognized as one of the main obstacles to the development of countries. Corruption is a problem that directly and indirectly affects each individual from very different shades and forms, which is why Transparency International defines it as the abuse of power in search of private gain.

Corruption is a phenomenon not only present in countries in transition or in the process of development, it is also in the strongest democratic systems. Several authors have shown that the weakness or lack of existence of trustworthy institutions towards the citizen creates scenarios or breeding grounds suitable for corruption, since there are no measures to control it, in addition to having a broad contubernio, which is known as network of corruption; usually in these scenarios the laws are ambiguous and meager, so that they are manipulative for each case and ad hoc for the personal benefit of those who hold power.

The most negative opinions on corruption trends are seen in Europe and North America, where 73% and 67% of people, respectively, believe that corruption has increased in the last three years. Despite these disappointing results, seven out of 10 people would be willing to report acts of corruption, an otherwise interesting fact (Global Barometer of Corruption, 2010). This index surveyed more than 91,000 people in 86 countries; focused on the facts of administrative bribery, the perceptions of public institutions and the people in whom respondents trust to fight corruption.

This survey showed that in the last 12 months, one in four people had paid bribes to state health, education or finance institutions. Respondents identified police as the most frequently bribed institution, while 29% of those who had contact with them reported having paid at least one bribe.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the highest rates of bribery were recorded: one in two reported having paid one in the last 12 months. There is a similar situation of 36% in the Middle East and North Africa, 32% in the New Independent States, 23% in Latin America, 19% in the Western Balkans and Turkey, 15% in Asia Pacific and only 5% in the countries of the European Union and in North America. This suggests that Europeans, Canadians and Americans also perceive an increase in corruption within their countries, although unlike others, are not willing to participate, and therefore tend to denounce it (Barómetro Global de la Corrupción, 2010).

In general terms, Parker argues that corruption finds an excellent breeding ground in States that have the following characteristics: 1) a public function in transition; 2) ambiguous, meager, cumbersome laws; 3) complex and excessive regulations; 4) excessive departmentalization; 5) lethargic and excessive bureaucratic structures; 6) weak control and audit institutions; 7) ineffective legislatures; 8) dysfunctional or ineffective judicial systems; 9) weak social controls, without real voice or interference; and 10) lack of political will.

The previous scenarios are mainly found in Latin American countries, which creates a vicious circle of corruption that facilitates continuous action (Parker, 2004). Gil Ibanez<sup>1</sup> refers that the European environment offers examples of the regulation of these duties, the most cited of these regulations being that of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, where the ideological bases are very similar and have been structured from solid laws that have eliminated corruption energetically. For example, in France, the 1983 Act dictates that officials have the obligation of hierarchical obedience, that of service, where there is a special emphasis on the incompatibility of private gainful activities, reserve and discretion, and prohibition to hold direct or indirect interests, both in companies subject to control by the administration where they provide their services, and other types of companies.

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<sup>1</sup> Incluso él ha propuesto la reducción de la corrupción de una forma holística, en donde deberían abordarse y elevar diversas normas sociales, como por ejemplo la puntualidad.

On the other hand, in Germany, the duties are described in the law of February 1985, according to which public servants must maintain a special legal-public fidelity, which binds the official to act at all times in favor of the State and order constitutional, in which political neutrality and respect for the interests of the community must prevail. Obedience to the superior is very important and obligatory, as long as it does not contravene the interests of the community. In addition, the service holder must have a correct treatment of other officials, seek to promote them, protect and assist them, maintain that ideal in favor of society and prevent their subordinates from generating scenarios conducive to corruption.

In the United Kingdom, the Management Code of 1993 establishes the basic principles of service, which indicate that official information is not misused, that there is total political neutrality, avoidance of conflicts of interest, the obedience of superiors and submission to the applicable rules. These principles are imprescriptible, even once the relationship with the institution has ceased, whether due to termination or retirement.

Undoubtedly it is not enough to make or implement a public service career, nor write these guidelines in a law: it is necessary to incardinate a series of endogenous and exogenous elements to reduce corruption, with which a cultural and social impact can be achieved. However, in spite of these examples there are several theories about the origin of corruption, correlated in an interesting way with social behaviors and scenarios. The following is a brief review of the most representative theses in this regard.

#### **1.4 Theories on Corruption**

There are several scientific explanations that try to order and give meaning to the origin and cause of corruption, such as the following:

##### **a) Functionalist theory**

This theory points out that the phenomenon of corruption is determined by the degree of political and economic development and the changes brought about by the transition from traditional principles to those of a new modern country structure, where this structure has not yet been properly assimilated by society. In that sense, the political and economic approximation of each

individual, allows him to evaluate it, rationalize it and before a problem or need makes a cost-benefit comparison, and makes a decision to become involved or not in corruption. In this evaluation, several elements are taken into account, aspects are evaluated in the short and medium term, which allows a decision to be made regarding the way of acting.

For the Mexican and Hidalgo case, in particular, corruption extends within the bureaucratic, political, economic, and administrative system; Before this the individuals analyze the cost of an illicit action with respect to a licit one, the waiting times, the cost, the diversity of procedures are valued and the conclusion is reached that the illegal act is lower. Donatella Della Porta refers that corruption arises when, for example, the political sphere begins to attract individuals who desire and can take personal advantage of public resources, that is, when the ideological politician is supplanted by the business politician. In this sense, even the public official who has the duty to take care of the interests of the governed, is supplanted by the official merchant (Della Porta, 2000).

On the other hand, political corruption has expanded and developed more successfully in developing countries and is related to the presence of weak institutions, so Douglass North notes that institutions of administration of justice, public administration and bureaucratic structures, have very limited mechanisms and structures, where it is easy to resort to corruption. Therefore, although institutions are governed by rules that control behavior, whether formal or informal, there are regulations, procedural acts, processes, among others, that provide ample opportunities to generate corruption due to the weakness of its structure. In countries with high rates of corruption, some or very few support institutions can be found, which are actually concerned with and concerned with reducing corruption; in this sense it will be necessary to question the scope and limitations of each one of them.

In most developing countries, the public sector is large, tortuous and extensive. A slow and inefficient bureaucracy creates the elements necessary for service buyers not to follow the rules, which facilitates receiving bribes, which increase the income of public officials, creating the vicious circle of those who do not fulfill their tasks for which they have been hired.

The media must be strong enough to serve as a support to society and exhibit corruption; only then will the corrupt value the disadvantages of being exhibited in such media. However, if the media are weak or aligned with certain power groups, they will not work to reduce corruption. In Mexico we have innumerable examples of the points previously mentioned; The above occurs at all levels of the structures, which even show an exhibit, but does not transcend another sphere (for example, the case of the precious Gober, PEMEX tenders, government tenders, the Ahumada case, the White House among many others). Another aspect of analysis is the perception of Mexicans regarding this phenomenon.

### **b) Institutional theory**

Institutional theory points out that people have to be able to express themselves through democratic processes; so political competition between parties, theoretically gives voters an option that allows them to express their ideals, even that expression has to be easily exposed through the press and other media. However, if political structures are not working, it is very easy for civil society, as well as corporations, to become involved in corruption to streamline their bureaucratic processes; thus, due to the weakness and ambiguity of the laws, public officials do not fear to be accused by illicit actions.

In that sense influences people's perception of respect, value and appreciation of laws; so that people obey them, they must be fair and follow the rules of society, and there must be the certainty that it can be applied to all without distinction. Again, the institutions that regulate the behavior of individuals must be full confidence. Nonetheless, in countries with high levels of corruption, it can be observed that the institutions that fight against this phenomenon are weak and overrun in every way.

Functionalist theory asserts that corruption has its roots in the system itself, trying to explain the periodic and cyclical emergence of corruption throughout history. This theory indicates that the emergence of the phenomenon is determined by the degree of political or economic development of societies, so its main hypothesis is that corruption is a functional dysfunction, replacing old and obsolete rules with new ones that are adapt to the changes that occur in other subsystems.

Some playfully or heroically consider or emphasize that once their political and economic functions have been fulfilled, corruption will tend to disappear.

### **c) Theory of modernization**

For Samuel Huntington, corruption is a phenomenon with greater predominance in some cultures than in others; this researcher concludes that in most cultures, their dominance is greater during the more intense phases of modernization, that is, when this process is still incipient and therefore weak (Huntington, 2004).

For Huntington, modernization entails changes in the basic values of society. For this reason, a conflict arises between traditional and new or modern norms, creating and recreating opportunities for individuals to justify their actions in corruption.

In that sense, Huntington argues that corruption is a direct creation of the new political groups that have ascended to power; its relation to politics is not defined by the dominant traditional norms. There is a serious problem, modern guidelines have not yet been accepted by the dominant groups of society, however the rejection of old rules tends to weaken the legitimacy of all. Hence, modernization also supports corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power; thus, in countries in the process of modernization, politics becomes the road to wealth. This is why it is stated that ambitions that can not find an echo in business seem to have an opportunity in corruption through politics, administration of justice, public administration, bureaucracy, among other public spaces. In this way, the political space is the space of economic power and benefit lato sensu.

In conclusion, modernization processes have created new structures that support the development of corruption; the ambiguity of the laws creates a window of opportunity for corruption, since often the requirements are not clearly specified, given their process.

#### **d) Theory of rational choice**

The theory of rational choice or rational choice holds that social behaviors can be deduced from the individuals who are supposed to guide only by maximizing their profits. These can in turn be defined as purely selfish and material, or based on a wide range of personal attitudes and values, according to the hard and soft version of the concept of rationality. That is to say, this theory would suppose that the corruption although it is certain, is in the governmental structures, is propitiated for the majority by the citizen or resident of such or that place, from his expectations and interests.

Several theorists question this approach because there are rational actors or actors who perform acts, such as voting or participating in associations, that do not give them clear and measurable benefits; for some, this theory has a partial view of human behavior.

Applying it to public officials, within a political-economic approach, corruption is considered as the result of a rational calculation of costs and benefits. In other words, the amount of corruption is determined by opportunities less risk. This approach coincides in that politicians and bureaucrats are interested both in money and power and therefore they try to strike a balance between the right behaviors to obtain money, besides the votes necessary to be reelected or to preserve those positions of power.

#### **e) Phenomenological Theory**

Phenomenology is the philosophical study of phenomena and how they are apprehended in "consciousness"; try to describe the structures of consciousness that have to do with them. Although it is a moral term, it refers to the internalization of man and his values of the environment and his action, specifically within the ethical context. Phenomenology belongs to the philosophy that analyzes and studies the phenomena thrown to consciousness, analyzes the essences of things and by extension is the science that studies the relationship between the facts or phenomena and the area in which this reality is made present, ie the psyche or consciousness. This is why this thesis is somewhat removed from this research, although its analysis is attractive and interesting.

This theory states that it is only from the social, economic, structural transformations that the phenomena of democracy, transparency or plurality are seen before a crisis that is generated, created and recreated before a new avalanche of corruption. In that sense, if the moral approaches are not very ingrained, it is easy to take and not to value how the previously immoral acts, in an apparent amoral context, enter into the internalization. Corruption is a discipline phenomenon, it is social, political, public administration, it grows associated with a lack of values and principles in a social collectivity co-sustained to man, which changes as the variables dependent on levels of poverty, of the adverse social environment, which modify axiological values and even question historical values.

Here a series of interesting elements enter into discussion. For some theoreticians, in lower bureaucratic activities, such as traffic officers, the cost of performing an illicit action is much less than the economic benefit obtained. In this scenario there is a discussion whether the corrupt act is greater or less than the benefit obtained; In this way, a dialectic of values, time and space is entered. This undoubtedly changes the tenuous perception of good and bad; for example, Garzón Valdés reports that Oskar Schindler bribed the heads of a Nazi concentration camp for the purpose of saving the lives of Jewish prisoners; in that understanding bribery was a good thing, especially if it was against the Nazis. Jorge Malem Seña says that there is empirical evidence that Wittgenstein bribed the German authorities not to disturb their sisters. Susan Rose-Ackerman considers the following: "Corruption may be more tolerable when it is carried out in clearly illegitimate regimes that can not claim to have popular support" (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).

This debate is interesting because the same fact from having different scenarios and actors, can be valued or not with the same intensity; Robert Klitgaard points out how, often, corruption from the West has been treated as a problem of unethical poor nations, although in the light of the moral sieve, corrupt facts are the same, what change are the actors and their scenarios.

#### **f) Theory of decentralization**

This theory argues that decentralizing administrative, political, bureaucratic functions, among many others, it is feasible to diversify responsibilities; This, coupled with the clarity of accountability, causes corruption to subside.



Finot points out that decentralization has made significant progress possible in terms of coverage of social services and even political participation, but creates pressures on fiscal balance and does not contribute to reducing economic concentration. It is for this reason that a differentiation between the provision and production of public goods allows, first of all, to distinguish between two types of decentralization: a policy, which would be the transfer of the whole process of provision of some public goods from the national to the subnational levels, and an economic one, which would be the transfer of production processes to economic competition (Finot, 2001).

For Finot, the fundamental condition for political decentralization to contribute to efficiency would be the democratic participation of citizens in decisions, not only on expenditure, but also on the contributions they make to solve it. This requirement has not yet been fulfilled in the Latin American processes because they have been treated similarly to the provision of basic infrastructure and public services, rather than to local assets in health and education, ie there is no differentiation of national public goods.

The strategic objective is to achieve these objectives or to deepen the political decentralization of the provision of infrastructure and basic services, and on this to lay the foundations for local development, while eliminating corruption processes.

Although it is true that a theory is not unique and does not explain this phenomenon, in the Mexican context the weakness of institutions opens the space for public officials to accept bribes, in addition to being warned such charges as a form of access to power and the money. For this reason, the administration of justice, public administration and the political sphere turn out to be conducive spaces for the development of corrupt practices, based on the shortcomings and limitations described above.

For some theorists of the liberal school, more is bet on laws that are met for all, that there is no difference of citizens, although it does not go into more details on the background of the problem, for example the immunity enjoyed by the President, deputies, senators, judges and magistrates, who operate in a context where it is almost impossible to stop them when they perform a corrupt action. Moreover, the role of the media since the year 2000 has become crucial to the fight against corruption; in this sense, civil society condemns harassment of journalists, censorship and

control of the media, although the political costs are not yet decisive for reaching or remaining in the sphere of power.

## **2. Statistical design of the Perception of Corruption Survey in the Metropolitan Area of the City of Pachuca, Hidalgo, 2015**

The study population is made up of people over 18 years of age or older living in private homes in the state of Hidalgo; individuals living in collective housing, such as prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, convents, hotels, guest houses, military facilities, etc., have not been included. In addition, only people who had their voter credential in force were interviewed in order to cast their vote.

The field survey of the pilot test was carried out in the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca, Hidalgo, in November of the year 2014; the number of houses visited to carry out the pilot test survey was 120, of which 50% were urban and 50% rural. The application of the survey in the two areas was acceptable and functional. The pilot survey allowed the questionnaire and the writing of some questions to be improved, as well as the training of the interviewers who applied the questionnaire.

A multistage probabilistic sampling design was used by clusters, forcing the sample to be corrected by 20% for non-response. The sampling scheme that was followed was stratified with selection of conglomerates in two stages. The sampling unit of the first stage was municipal and was continued according to all existing localities. A separation was made between rural, semi-urban and urban localities, all of which were likely to be elected.

The survey has a confidence level of 95%, with a calculation error of 5% at the regional level and a non-response of 20%. The fieldwork for the survey was carried out from 1 to 25 February of the year 2015; the questionnaire consisted of 63 questions. The survey collected information from 1,920 selected useful households.

The previous precision and confidence requirements made it necessary to use a simple sampling scheme without replacement, with a sample size between 138 and 384 cases for each domain. For the purposes of design, the maximum point of 400 was taken to be representative for each gender and urban rural location (Jonson, 1997; Mendenhall, 1997, 2002, Weimer, 2003 and Bundick, 2004). The municipalities included in the sample were eight, which make up the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca. The municipalities included were Mineral de la Reforma, Mineral del Chico, Mineral del Monte, Zempoala, Epazoyucan, San Agustín Tlaxiaca, Zapotlán de Juárez and Pachuca.

The distribution of the questionnaires was done following the quota method, in order to respect the proportions of demographic characteristics presented by the metropolitan area and each of its municipalities.

### **3. Some results of the survey Perception of Corruption in the Metropolitan Zone of the City of Pachuca, Hidalgo 2015**

As a background, according to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), prepared by Transparency International, Mexico ranks 98th on a list of 178 sites, along with Egypt and Burkina Faso. The overall rating of the country in 2010 was 3.1. It is noteworthy that Mexico is below El Salvador that occupied the 73rd place, Cuba, which is said to have deteriorated and fell to the 69th place.

For Transparency International, countries with the lowest ratings have the highest rates of corruption, which prevents them from facing poverty, climate change problems and financial instability in their countries.

In Latin America, the best placed country was Chile, with place 21, followed by Uruguay (24), Puerto Rico (33) and Costa Rica (41); while the Latin American countries with the worst position were Venezuela (164), Paraguay (146) and Nicaragua (127).

At the international level, Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore are the countries with the lowest number of places on the list, with a lower score of 9.3; Somalia, on the other hand, ranked

last in the list of 178 countries, with a score of 1.1, just below Myanmar (176), Afghanistan (176) and Iraq (175).

According to the Corruption Perception Index 2015 (CPI), prepared by Transparency International, by 2015, Mexico ranked 95th out of 167 countries, sharing that site with Armenia, the Philippines and Mali.

Analyzing the data on corruption in the Mexican context, it is possible to affirm that this phenomenon is deeply rooted within the country, specifically in the state of Hidalgo, which has changed significantly its corruption index, with a negative trend. According to the National Index of Corruption and Good Governance (INCBG), which uses a scale ranging from 0 to 100, where less corruption, lower index, interesting data are observed. In 2001, the lowest corruption was observed in the entities of Colima (3.0), Baja California Sur (3.9), Aguascalientes (4.5) and Coahuila (5.0). On the contrary, the entities with the highest level of corruption were the Federal District (22.6), the State of Mexico (17.0) and Guerrero (13.4); the state of Hidalgo ranked 17 out of 32, although it remained below the national average of 10.6 points.

The index published in 2003 showed that there was lower corruption in the entities of Baja California Sur (2.3), Quintana Roo (3.7), Colima (3.8); tied in four place were Hidalgo and Aguascalientes with 3.9 each, which showed an apparent radical change. In this way, to descend from the 17 to 4 place a quite significant advance. In the same year, the most corrupt entities were Guerrero (12.0), Durango (12.6), Estado de México (12.7), Federal District (13.2) and Puebla with 18.0 points.

The 2003 results showed that corruption was higher among young heads of household (9.31), heads of household with higher schooling, that is to say with high school (10.37) and university (10.21). While the index was lower in heads of household over 50 (7.41) and heads of households with lower incomes, up to a minimum wage (7.50). At that time it should be remembered that in Hidalgo 12.8% of the population did not receive income, 22.9% earned less than one minimum wage, 33.6% from one to two minimum wages, that is, 69.3% received less than two minimum wages. 12.8% of the population received between two and three minimum wages, 10.7% between three and five minimum wages and only 7.2% five minimum wages and more. These data on the

one hand indicated that income was weighted below the national average, as well as that in Hidalgo, given the low level of schooling, it seemed to suggest that it only reached for low profile corruption, such as fines for parking in places forbidden, pay "bites" for passing a stop, among others.

However, in 2005, Hidalgo rose to prominence in corruption, becoming 29th out of 32, only below the State of Mexico, Tabasco and the Federal District, and where Robert Klitgaard's thesis on corruption associated with poor spaces, with no schooling and therefore lack of ethics, especially in poor nations, all of which seemed to have some correspondence. In 2007 according to the ICBG survey, Hidalgo again descends abruptly and installs in place 15 of 32; these data suggest that Hidalgo at various times despite its marginalization, low income, limited schooling, among other variables, is also a corrupt entity with a diffuse behavior.

The index published in 2007 showed that there was less corruption in the entities of Colima (3.1), Aguascalientes (4.7), Guanajuato (5.1), Nayarit (5.2), Michoacan (5.7) and Quintana Roo (5.8). In that same year, the entities with the highest level of corruption were Puebla (11.0), Tlaxcala (11.7), Estado de México (18.8) and the Federal District (12.7). The Hidalgo entity occupied the 15th place, along with Chiapas, reaching an index of 7.1 points.

For 2010, this same comparative index showed that the less corrupt entities were Baja California Sur (1.8), Durango (3.9), Nayarit (4.4), Aguascalientes (4.7) and Yucatan (5.0); On the other hand, Hidalgo ranked 28th out of 32 with an index of 11.6 points, just below Oaxaca (13.4), Guerrero (16.0), Estado de México (16.4) and the Federal District, with 17.9 points. For this year, Hidalgo not only ranked among the top states with the highest corruption, also had an index above the national average that was 10.

Data from the ICBG survey, like the 2010 Barometer Report and other studies analyzing corruption in Mexico, although working with some state indicators and with direct questions to interviewees, can vary the calculated degrees of corruption, because it does not depend on the degree of perception of the population exclusively, also include aspects such as the existence of certain laws, instruments of control, among other indicators. In this sense, the survey that will be

analyzed in this research has the advantage of being constructed based on the perceptions of the citizens, and does not depend on other exogenous elements.

Although it should not be overlooked that there are many forms of corruption, and this can be analyzed from different points of view, the present investigation is of greater interest in corruption linked to the political and administrative sphere, which is at least the which most upset the civilian population. In addition, from the results obtained in the survey entitled Perception of corruption in the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca, Hidalgo, 2015 reveals that there is a great perception on the part of citizens about these behaviors, especially committed by politicians and public servants who sell corruption for their benefit.

This survey took care within the sample calculation, preserve the demographic proportions, as well as other variables; 45.8% of men and 54.2% of women were interviewed. Globally, 33.5% of respondents were in the 18-29 age group, 44.2% were between 30-49 years of age, while 22.3% were in the group of 50 and over.

Schooling is in line with that observed in the metropolitan area of Pachuca: 4.5% of the population without schooling, 22.8% with primary level studies, 31.9% with secondary level studies, 27.7% with equivalent high school education, 12.4% with professional studies and 0.7% with postgraduate.

At the time of starting the questionnaire, the interviewees were asked the words that came to their mind when they heard the term corruption; 33.5% associated it with power groups, the government or its structures; 48.3% related it to robbery, lies, deceit and "tranza" (see Table 1).

**Table 1.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: ideas asociadas con la corrupción, según sexo, 2015.

Idea	Total	Hombres	Mujeres
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Políticos (diputados, senadores, Presidente, Secretarios de Gobierno, etc.)	7.9	6.1	9.7
Gobierno, gobernantes, autoridades.	11.4	13.1	9.7
Burocracia	0.7	0.7	0.6
Narcotráfico	2.05	2.2	1.9
Tráfico armas	0.4	0.4	0.4
Tráfico de personas	0.15	0.1	0.2
Policía	9.0	12.1	5.9
Partidos políticos	0.7	1.0	0.3
ONG	0.2	0.0	0.4
Dinero	12.8	13.3	12.2
Transa, robo	23.7	22.7	24.6
Mentira, engaños	24.6	22.6	26.6
Hechos de tránsito terrestre, accidentes.	3.8	3.4	4.2
Otros.	2.8	2.3	3.3

Source: encuesta intitulada: *Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.*


### 3.1 Perception of corruption

For one in four residents of the city of Pachuca, the main cause of corruption in Mexico is because laws only benefit the powerful, for one in four is because laws are not met, one of each six consider that it is because all Mexicans are corrupt, and for one in three, the cause is that politicians and government officials are corrupt, there are no significant differences according to gender (see Figure 1).

For one in four residents of the city of Pachuca, the main cause of corruption in Hidalgo is that the laws only benefit the powerful; for three out of ten it is because laws are not enforced, one in seven is because all Mexicans are corrupt, while for one in three there is corruption because politicians and government officials generate it.

For one in three residents of Pachuca city, the main cause of corruption in the municipality of Pachuca is because laws only benefit the powerful; for one in five is because the laws are not met, for one in eight is because all Mexicans are corrupt, while one in three, think that is because politicians and government officials are corrupt

**Figure 1.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: principal causa de la corrupción en México, según sexo, 2015.



Fuente: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

It is observed that there is a perception on the part of the residents of the city of Pachuca, to think that in the three levels of government, the corruption is due to that the politicians and officials are corrupt.

### 3.2 Perception of ending corruption and its growth


Four out of ten residents of the city of Pachuca consider that in Mexico it is impossible to end corruption, for one in three it is scarcely possible to eliminate it, one in five considers that it is possible to eradicate it, while one in twenty refers to it is quite possible to end corruption, without there being significant differences according to gender; it could be said that, in general terms, women in greater proportion consider that it is impossible to end corruption, and in this sense men are slightly more optimistic (see Figure 2).



In terms of ending corruption in the state of Hidalgo, the perception is more promising: one in four says it is impossible (22.9%), for four out of ten it is unlikely to eliminate it (39.1%), for three of each 10 is possible to eradicate it (31.8%), while one in sixteen (6.2%) refers that it is very possible to end corruption, without significant differences according to gender.

Concerning the growth of corruption in the city of Pachuca, six out of ten residents consider it to grow every year (62.9%), three out of ten say it is the same (31.1%), one in twenty-seven says it has decreased, while one in forty-four (2.3%) reported that there is no corruption in the municipality of Pachuca. In both items, there are no significant gender differences.

**Figure 2.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: percepción de terminar con la corrupción en México, según sexo, 2015.



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

### 3.3 Laws, location of corruption in structures and origin


For three out of four residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca (74.1%) citizens only respect the laws when it suits them, for one in six (16.5%), citizens never respect the laws and for one of each ten (9.4%) citizens always respect the laws (see Figure 3).

For six out of ten residents of the city of Pachuca (63.6%), corruption is at all levels of structures, for one in five (21.5%) corruption is at high levels, for one in ten (10.4 per cent) corruption occurs at the middle levels, while for one in 22 (4.5 per cent), corruption is found at low levels of structures, although it is slightly noticed that women corruption is found in all spaces (see Figure 4).

As to why corrupt people receive money, one out of every two residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca (54%) report that there is a chain of corruption for one in three (27.5%), there is an ambition that motivates them to become corrupted, one in ten is due to a need (11.3%), while one in fourteen (7.2%) refers to the custom that people have to be corrupt. According to the gender, a greater number of women (67.2%) who notice the existence of a chain of corruption, with respect to the men (50.0%), are slightly noticed.


Asking who is responsible for ending corruption, about six out of ten (58.3%) say that it is a responsibility of the entire population, one in five (23.4%) is a job that must be done by the government, for one in eight (12.5%) corruption will never end, for one in twenty-nine (3.5%) is a joint responsibility between government and population, one in forty-three (2.3%) mentions that it is a responsibility of the church. Analyzing the data by gender, there are no significant differences.

**Figure 3.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: percepción de cuándo respetan las leyes los ciudadanos, según sexo, 2015.



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

**Figure 4.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: percepción de la corrupción según nivel, diferenciando según sexo, 2015.



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

Nearly seven out of ten residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca (67.8%) qualify Hajalans as honest, provided corruption is not required, ie with an implicit degree of corruption; for one in five, Hidalgoans are corrupt (19.7%), while only one in eight (12.5%) say that hidalguenses in general are honest.

### **3.4 Some indicators of level of corruption**

A number of questions were asked, including some factors that make people aware of corruption in everyday life; the respondent was asked to respond in the most sincere way, emphasizing that it does not include whether it is a good or bad social concept.

Among the behaviors evaluated, four out of ten residents of the city of Pachuca (37.3%) say that although it is bad, gifts must be given to expedite a process. Four out of ten (39.2%) are in the same position by giving a "bite" to get a fine. Four out of ten (39.4%) say that it is acceptable to lie, if no one is harmed.

For one in three residents of the city of Pachuca (32.1%) is bad but it is necessary, accept gifts or gifts to do favors, one in three (33.1%) accept the use of the accordion in the exams, as well as make calls of long distance of a telephone that is not own (32.3%). Also one in three residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca (33.1%) consider that it is valid to invent an excuse not to be reprimanded. According to gender, it is noted that more men agree on various corrupt facts compared to women, even adding the columns is wrong but it is necessary to do and it is not bad, the highest percentages are noticed in men (see Tables 2 and 3).

A number of statements were made and the respondents had to answer whether they were in full agreement with it, whether they were largely in agreement, largely disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. He points out that 86.2% of Pachuca city residents consider that all parties are corrupt, a percentage similar to those who think politicians are corrupt (86.3%). 83.7% consider that there are many guilty people in the street, and 83.3% report that in prisons there are many innocent people.

82.8% consider that drug trafficking is immersed in the structures of government in the entity, and 82.7% say that corruption is due in large part to politicians.

A 79.0% of the residents of the conurbation area of the city of Pachuca considers that at some point we have participated in corruption, while 75.9% say that we have all given at least once a "bite".

**Table 2.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca hombres: percepción de conductas diversas y su relación con la corrupción, 2015.

Supuesto enunciado	Total	Nunca se debe hacer	Esta mal pero es necesario hacerlo	No está mal, y es necesario hacerlo
Total	100.0	62.8	32.3	4.9
1) Dar un obsequio o dinero para agilizar un trámite	100.0	54.7	41.0	4.3
2) Conducir veloz un auto si no hay policía o radar	100.0	71.4	25.2	3.4
3) Aceptar regalos o dádivas a cambio de favores	100.0	58.6	35.0	6.4
4) Pagar una mordida para que perdonen una multa	100.0	53.9	42.2	3.9
5) Evadir impuestos si se sabe que no me descubrirán	100.0	69.7	27.7	2.6
6) Pasarse el alto si no hay policías	100.0	70.6	25.6	3.8
7) Mentir por conveniencia, siempre y cuando no dañe a otro	100.0	46.6	46.6	6.8
8) No pedir factura para evitar pagar el IVA	100.0	62.4	29.9	7.7
9) Copiar en los exámenes o llevar acordeón	100.0	59.3	39.0	1.7
10) Hacer llamadas de larga distancia desde un teléfono ajeno	100.0	57.3	39.2	3.5
11) Llenar documentos con datos falsos por conveniencia	100.0	73.1	24.4	2.5
12) Llevarse mercancía sin pagar de un supermercado	100.0	78.7	17.9	3.4
13) Inventar una excusa para no ser reprendido	100.0	57.7	36.8	5.5
14) Que un funcionario público favorezca a parientes y amigos	100.0	66.7	28.2	5.1
15) No devolver un cambio equivocado, en donde se nos ha dado dinero de más	100.0	60.8	26.1	13.1

Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

**Table 3.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca mujeres: percepción de conductas diversas y su relación con la corrupción, 2015.

<b>Supuesto enunciado</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Nunca se debe hacer</b>	<b>Esta mal pero es necesario hacerlo</b>	<b><u>No</u> está mal, y es necesario hacerlo</b>
Total	100.0	68.4	24.7	6.9
1) Dar un obsequio o dinero para agilizar un trámite	100.0	60.6	35.0	4.4
2) Conducir veloz un auto si no hay policía o radar	100.0	74.7	21.7	3.6
3) Aceptar regalos o dadas a cambio de favores	100.0	60.7	30.2	9.1
4) Pagar una mordida para que perdonen una multa	100.0	57.3	37.4	5.3
5) Evadir impuestos si se sabe que no me descubrirán	100.0	72.0	24.1	3.9
6) Pasarse el alto si no hay policías	100.0	74.8	21.0	4.2
7) Mentir por conveniencia, siempre y cuando no dañe a otro	100.0	57.3	33.7	9.0
8) No pedir factura para evitar pagar el IVA	100.0	69.9	21.1	9.0
9) Copiar en los exámenes o llevar acordeón	100.0	64.7	28.9	6.4
10) Hacer llamadas de larga distancia desde un teléfono ajeno	100.0	68.0	26.8	5.2
11) Llenar documentos con datos falsos por conveniencia	100.0	79.9	15.7	4.4
12) Llevarse mercancía sin pagar de un supermercado	100.0	82.7	12.5	4.8
13) Inventar una excusa para no ser reprendido	100.0	62.2	30.5	7.3
14) Que un funcionario público favorezca a parientes y amigos	100.0	74.0	18.6	7.4
15) No devolver un cambio equivocado, en donde se nos ha dado dinero de más	100.0	67.0	13.9	19.1

Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

For 72% of the residents of the city of Pachuca, if a woman ruled she would be less corrupt, while 65% considered that men are more corrupt. On the other hand, for 58.8%, young people are less corrupt than older people.

Politicians are the most corrupt social actors from their structures (88.3%), followed closely by politicians (87.3%), deputies and senators (84.0%), and political parties as a group (82.1%). To the explicit question, do you trust political parties? 88.2% said no. To the explicit question, do you trust politicians? 90.2% said no.


### **3.5 Electoral processes in Hidalgo and democracy**

He asked himself how often it is customary to go to vote when there are elections; globally in the city of Pachuca, 19.5% said they always voted, 21.8% said that they often vote (this corresponds to the percentage that votes on the average in the entity), 36.9% said they voted few times and 21.8% say never to vote 26.5% who said they voted rarely and 27.8% said they never voted, why not pay? What is the cause that leads you away from the polls? The answer to this question is that the parties are corrupt, that the elections are not clean, that politicians are in conspiracy with drug traffickers, that political parties and politicians only look for the vote when the elections are, and that only interests power and money.

Regarding electoral processes in Hidalgo, six out of ten residents of the city of Pachuca consider that they are manipulated (61.5%), three out of ten are fraudulent (31.1%), that is, more than nine out of ten residents observe them opacity or non-transparent. On the other hand, for one of every fourteen (7.4%) residents of the conurbation zone of the city of Pachuca the electoral processes in the entity are clean (see Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: ¿Cómo considera los procesos electorales en Hidalgo?



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

By asking them an exercise in retrospection of the interviewees, they were asked about Mexico's presidential elections in 2006, how would they qualify them? For one in two (55.3) were manipulated presidential elections, three out of ten mentioned that they were fraud (30%), and only one in seven said they were transparent (14.7%). There are no significant differences according to gender.

Questioning about the perception of democracy in Mexico, for one in three residents of the city of Pachuca (34.9%), democracy does not exist, for three out of ten (28.9%) democracy is incipient, for one in five (23.0%) democracy at the national level is in the process of consolidation, and for one out of seven it is consolidated (13.2%).


As for democracy in Hidalgo, the results are very similar: for one out of every three residents of the city of Pachuca, democracy does not exist (32.6%), democracy is incipient (28.4%), for one in four (24.9%) democracy in the entity is in the process of consolidation, while for one in seven (14.1%) is consolidated.

### 3.6 Ways to reduce corruption in Hidalgo

A series of questions was asked of residents of the city of Pachuca, who are likely to have a potential impact on reducing corruption:

- 77.4% believe that if drugs were legalized, it would not reduce corruption.
- 85.2% consider that if arms were legalized for all citizens, it would not reduce corruption.
- For 86.1% if prostitution was legalized, corruption would not be reduced.
- For 80.5% if the penal age was reduced, it would not reduce corruption.
- For 45.1% if criminal laws would tighten if corruption would decrease.
- 54.5% consider that if the death penalty were implemented, corruption could be reduced


**Figure 6.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: ¿Considera que si se instrumentaran leyes más severas, disminuiría la corrupción?



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

In the last two items, women are slightly more likely to harden laws, whereas men consider the death penalty to be a means of reducing corruption (see Figures 6 and 7); in the other areas, there are no significant differences according to gender.

**Figure 7.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: ¿considera que si se aplicara la pena de muerte, disminuiría la corrupción?



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

### 3.7 Drug Trafficking and Corruption

When asked about the presence of drug trafficking in Mexico, 40.5% of the residents of the city of Pachuca consider that drug trafficking has a total presence in the Mexican context, for a 47.5% presence is large, that is, adding up both percentages, for 87.7% of the residents of the city of Pachuca is considerable the presence of drug trafficking in the country. 10.7% say that the presence of drug trafficking is low, while for 1.6% there is no such presence.

With regard to the presence of drug trafficking in Hidalgo, the results are more flattering: for 22.3% of the residents of the city of Pachuca they consider that drug trafficking has a total presence, for a 48.7% its presence is great, that is to say, adding up both percentages, for 71.0% of residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca is considerable the presence of drug

trafficking in the entity. 26.5% say that the presence of drug trafficking is low, and for 2.5% there is no presence of drug trafficking in the entity.


When questioning copper the presence of drug trafficking in the city of Pachuca, 24.1% consider that drug trafficking has a total presence, for 42.2% its presence is a lot; adding up both percentages, for 66.3% of residents the presence of drug trafficking is considerable. 31.9% say that the presence of drug trafficking is low, and 1.8% say it is non-existent. The data suggest that the municipality best positioned is that of Pachuca, although seen with a drug trafficking presence of 66.3%; on the other hand, in these items no significant differences were observed.

When questioning whether the "executions" that have occurred in the entity have a correlation with corruption, 66.1% of the residents of the conurbation area of the city of Pachuca consider that there is such a relationship, while for 14.5% there is no between executions and corruption; 19.4% reported not knowing.

When correlating executions, corruption and drug trafficking, 72% consider that this interaction exists, while 12.2% of the residents of the city of Pachuca consider that there is no such relationship; 15.8% mentioned not knowing.

The figure of the politicians and the perception about them are a synonym of corruption, however when asked if any of the interviewee's children wanted to engage in politics, 6.7% said they would be proud, 56.2% mentioned that they would let his son fulfilled his vocation, while 37.1% said he would try to change his mind.


**Figure 8.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: si su hijo (a) le comentara que le gustaría ser político (a) ¿qué haría usted?



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

However, when asked if any child of the interviewee wanted to engage in drug trafficking, there is clearly a general idea of rejection, but emphasizes that 4.1% said they would be proud, 9.2% mentioned that they would let their child fulfill their vocation, while that 86.7% said they would try to change their minds (see Figures 8 and 9).

**Figure 9.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: si su hijo (a) le comentara que le gustaría ser narcotraficante ¿Qué haría usted?




Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

### 3.8 War between drug trafficking and the State

To the question of how this war between drug trafficking and the Federal Government of Mexico is rated and observed, 13.3% of the residents of Pachuca consider that it was an excellent decision by the executive, for 34% it was a good proposal, 31.6 % rated it bad, while for 21.1% it was a poor decision; in general terms the perception is very similar and divided: one in two considers it was good and one in two thinks otherwise, without there being significant differences according to gender.

Around whom will win this war, 61.9% of residents of the city of Pachuca says that drug trafficking, 30.6% trust it to be the Federal Government, 5.8% say that neither, for 0.8% the end of this war will be negotiated between the two parties, while for the 0.7% the winner is citizenship, and 0.2% say that the winners are the entrepreneurs (differences according to gender are not significant, see Figure 10).

**Figure 10.** Zona Metropolitana de Pachuca: la guerra entre gobierno federal y el narcotráfico en México ¿Quién la ganará?



Source: datos ponderados de la encuesta intitulada Percepción de la corrupción en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de Pachuca Hidalgo. 2015.

Finally, it was questioned about the insecurity of the municipality and how it will be in the next years, 57.7% of the residents of Pachuca city considers that it will increase, for 33% will remain the same, and 9.3% say that it will decrease, without there are significant differences according to gender.

#### 4. Some conclusions

At present, political corruption is a central issue of concern among the world's major democracies. Political campaigns are an area of democratic practice in which the most important freedoms such as voting, voting and freedom of expression are exercised. However, most corruption cases in contemporary democracies are linked to political campaign funding. It can be assumed that due to the strong need for financing capital faced by political actors, the ideal scenario for the entry of corrupt groups, such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons or arms trafficking among the most important.

The perception of honesty and the degree of trust placed in the various institutions of justice and other social and political figures is very low; the men and women of the city of Pachuca, Hidalgo, learn or understand the political phenomenon linked to corruption, the various institutions and the acting of their officials as untrustworthy, which translates into a lack of confidence in the political structure and of administration of justice. The political sphere is closely linked to corruption and drug trafficking. Among the main findings are the following:

- The results seem to validate the hypothesis; there is a move away from the polls given that it is noted that the political sphere is linked to corruption and drug trafficking. When respondents were asked by semantic networks the words that came to their mind at the time of hearing the term corruption, 33.5% related it to power groups or the government itself. For this reason, 50% of the residents of the city of Pachuca consider that the main cause of corruption in Mexico is due to the fact that the laws only benefit the powerful, and therefore are not fulfilled in favor of the population. This perception is very similar for the state of Hidalgo as a whole. Similarly, from its critical point of view, corruption exists at all three levels of government.
- For one in three citizens it is unlikely to eliminate corruption in Mexico; even more 62.9% consider a growth of corruption in the city of Pachuca year by year. Even three out of four residents of the metropolitan area of Pachuca claim that citizens only respect the laws when it suits them, which seems to conform Buscaglia's position, of an absence of rule of law. For 63.6% of the residents of the city of Pachuca corruption is at all levels of structures; 54% consider that there is a chain of corruption to the degree that 67.8% refer that the Hidalgoes are honest, as long as there is no need for corruption, because there is "disposition" of it by the citizens. This justifies that 37.3% consider that although it is bad, it is necessary to give gifts to expedite a process. Four out of ten (39.2%) are in the same position by giving a "bribe" to get a fine. Four out of ten (39.4%) say that it is acceptable to lie, if no one is harmed. For one out of three residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca (32.1%) is bad but it is necessary, accept gifts or gifts to do favors, one in three (33.1%) have other positions.



- It stands out that 86.2% of Pachuca city residents consider that all parties are corrupt, a percentage similar to those who think politicians are corrupt (86.3%). 82.8% believe that drug trafficking is involved in the entity's governance structures, and 82.7% say that corruption is due in large part to politicians. A 79.0% consider that everyone has at some point participated in corruption, while 75.9% say that we have all given at least once a "bite".
- Policemen are the most corrupt social actors from their structures (88.3%), followed closely by politicians (87.3%), deputies and senators (84.0%), and political parties (82.1%). That is why 88.2% said they did not trust the latter; 90.2% do not trust politicians.
- This explains in large measure that 19.5% said they always voted, 21.8% said that they often vote, 36.9% said they voted few times and 21.8% never vote; when they ask those who vote little and never why they do not attend the polls, citizens respond that parties are corrupt, that elections are not clean, that politicians are mixed with drug traffickers, that political parties and politicians only seek the vote when the elections, and that only interested power and money to such social actors.

This brief description seems to respond clearly to the perception of 61.5% of the residents of the city of Pachuca who considers that political processes are manipulated; 31.1% describe them as fraudulent, that is, more than nine out of ten are opaque or not transparent.

The perception of democracy in Mexico is explained alone: for 34.9% it does not exist, for 28.9% it is incipient. In the context of the state of Hidalgo, the results are similar.

87.7% of the resident population of the metropolitan area of Pachuca considers that drug trafficking has a very important presence in the Mexican context, therefore they think they are related to corruption (66.1%) and drug trafficking (72%).

To conclude, within the present work some important theses have been demonstrated:

a) Edgardo Buscaglia's thesis that the crime that is most organized in Mexico is politics, seems to be fully demonstrated. In the metropolitan area of Pachuca residents do not trust either political

parties or politicians; on average, only 50% participate in the electoral processes. Participation in political groups is very small, and above all, they observe this corruption and relationship between the political sphere, corruption and the nexuses of drug trafficking. It seems to indicate that what Buscaglia asserts when he says that Mexican politicians generate a pact of silence far more effective than the Sinaloa Cartel, residents of the metropolitan area of Pachuca, observe it, they warn, perhaps not with that precision that Buscaglia it affirms it, but they intuit it within their answers embodied in this work. From the results obtained within the survey in the entity, it is corroborated that the abstentionism and low participation electoral politics is a product of that vote of silence, of protest for the system that we have.

The results are very interesting: there are some issues that remain unresolved, for example, what happens to governability in Mexico? Schmidt reports that he appears to be partially controlled, although he rhetorically claims that the explanation is that the Mexican elite is characterized by conceptual and intellectual poverty; lack of leadership skills; conservatism, conventional thinking, value weakness, deviation around social and political responsibility, pursuit of complacency and self-gratification above any social purpose. All in all, says the author, he has an antidemocratic attitude, so maybe the governability is weak, but before this attitude of the Mexicans, seems to be strengthened.

b) On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the abstentionists do not constitute a homogeneous block, and in Muxel's words for the case of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca Hidalgo there are two types of abstentionism, sociological and political type (Muxel, 2006). The first type of abstention refers to voters who are little interested in politics and who, therefore, maintain a sense of estrangement, which observe the tripod of corruption, drug trafficking and political sphere. On the other hand political abstentionism that includes citizens who are interested in politics and who at the same time feel part of some political organization but do not participate because they consider that their vote is irrelevant to the factual situation of the city capital and its metropolitan area. In other words, it is a protest against the political class or a sanction aimed at the government administration and trying to influence the proposals of either the rulers or the candidates, is a claim (Muxel, 2006).

c) In the study carried out by the Federal Electoral Institute, for the specific case of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca Hidalgo, the results suggest there is a lack of meaning and effectiveness of the political class, as well as a poor identification of citizens with political parties.

d) Finally, we can not fail to affirm what was raised by Ana Fernández Poncela, who points out that a good number of voters refrain from voting motivated by political reasons, rather than by political disinterest in general; in this sense, the author argues that, in case of disinterest on the part of the elector, this would not indicate apathy, rather as a derivation of generalized overeating towards the actions of politicians in our society (Fernández Poncela, 2009).

In conclusion, the results seem to indicate that the depoliticization of the residents of the metropolitan area of the city of Pachuca has provoked, beyond their absence at the polls, an absence of a national and local agenda, because politicians lack the factual possibility of action, as well as of the plans for the future; the society is muted without access to the decision-making spheres, because the government does not open them to enter the citizen's opinion.

The position that I assume in the present investigation is that the abstentionism in the city of Pachuca is a product of that silent voice, fed up with the political system, which is colluded with corruption and drug trafficking; in this sense it is not because people do not realize it. This paper considers Buscaglia's position when he says: organized crime in Mexico is more organized (Buscaglia, 2015). The vote and the absence of the population towards the political life seems to explain itself.

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